> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://doc.blueapi.ir/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Security Requirements Specification

> Numbered security requirements for authentication, encryption, secrets, audit logging, malicious model detection, dependency scanning, and offline operation.

EMEP operates on sensitive model weights, proprietary datasets, and competitive benchmark results. This page enumerates the security requirements that every component must satisfy, grouped by domain and mapped to verification methods.

## Requirement Table

| ID    | Requirement                                                          | Component                 | Verification                    | Priority |
| ----- | -------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------- | ------------------------------- | -------- |
| SR-01 | All API calls require a valid bearer token                           | API Specification         | Penetration test                | P1       |
| SR-02 | Tokens expire after 24 hours and are single-refresh                  | API Specification         | Token lifecycle test            | P1       |
| SR-03 | Failed auth attempts are rate-limited and logged                     | API Specification         | Load test + log audit           | P1       |
| SR-04 | Role-based access controls enforce least privilege                   | Authorization Service     | RBAC matrix test                | P1       |
| SR-05 | Model download restricted to operator and deployer roles             | ModelRegistry             | Role escalation test            | P1       |
| SR-06 | Merge execution restricted to experimenter role                      | MergeEngine               | Role escalation test            | P1       |
| SR-07 | Model weights encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM                     | ArtifactStore             | Encryption audit                | P1       |
| SR-08 | Registry metadata encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM                 | ModelRegistry             | Encryption audit                | P1       |
| SR-09 | All inter-service traffic over TLS 1.3                               | Runtime Architecture      | TLS scan                        | P1       |
| SR-10 | Certificate pinning for internal services                            | Runtime Architecture      | Pin validation test             | P2       |
| SR-11 | Secrets stored in HSM-backed vault; never in env vars                | Secret Management         | Secret scan + config audit      | P1       |
| SR-12 | Key rotation automated with 90-day overlap                           | Artifact Signing          | Rotation drill                  | P1       |
| SR-13 | Signing keys air-gapped in enterprise deployments                    | Artifact Signing          | Air-gap audit                   | P1       |
| SR-14 | Every model load, merge, eval, and deploy action logged              | Audit Logging             | Log completeness test           | P1       |
| SR-15 | Logs are tamper-evident with Merkle tree or chain hash               | Audit Logging             | Hash verification test          | P2       |
| SR-16 | Retain audit logs for 7 years in enterprise mode                     | Audit Logging             | Retention policy audit          | P2       |
| SR-17 | Scan downloaded models for known poisoning signatures                | Malicious Model Detection | Signature database test         | P1       |
| SR-18 | Reject models with NaN/Inf weight spikes before merge                | Merge Validation          | Fuzz test with poisoned weights | P1       |
| SR-19 | Safety evaluation must PASS before release                           | Evaluation Framework      | Safety eval bypass test         | P1       |
| SR-20 | All dependencies pinned with exact version and hash                  | Dependency Safety         | SBOM diff test                  | P1       |
| SR-21 | CVE scan runs on every build; block on CRITICAL                      | Dependency Safety         | CVE injection test              | P1       |
| SR-22 | Maintain offline dependency mirror for air-gapped sites              | Dependency Safety         | Mirror sync test                | P2       |
| SR-23 | Container images scanned for OS vulnerabilities before deploy        | Container Scanning        | Image scan test                 | P1       |
| SR-24 | Container runtime runs as non-root with read-only rootfs             | Container Scanning        | CIS benchmark scan              | P2       |
| SR-25 | Air-gapped deployments have zero egress routes                       | Offline Security          | Network scan + packet capture   | P1       |
| SR-26 | Physical media transfers use sealed containers with chain of custody | Offline Security          | Transfer log audit              | P1       |
| SR-27 | Log egress via one-way transfer only (data diode or sneakernet)      | Offline Security          | Egress path test                | P1       |

## Trust Boundary Diagram

```mermaid theme={null}
flowchart TB
    subgraph EXT["External Zone"]
        SRC[Model Sources]
        USR[Users / API Clients]
    end

    subgraph RZ["Research Zone"]
        DISC[Discovery + Download]
        REG[ModelRegistry]
    end

    subgraph SZ["Staging Zone"]
        MERGE[MergeEngine]
        EVAL[EvaluationEngine]
        TRACK[ExperimentTracker]
    end

    subgraph PZ["Production Zone"]
        REL[Release]
        DEP[DeploymentManager]
        INF[InferenceBackend]
    end

    subgraph EZ["Air-Gapped Enterprise Zone"]
        OFF[Offline Registry]
        OFFSIG[Offline Signing HSM]
        OFFDEP[Offline Deployment]
    end

    SRC -->|TLS 1.3| DISC
    USR -->|TLS 1.3| API[API Gateway]
    API --> RZ
    RZ -->|mTLS| SZ
    SZ -->|mTLS| PZ
    PZ -.->|Sneakernet / Data Diode| EZ
```

Traffic between zones uses mutual TLS. The enterprise zone has no network path back to staging or production.

## Cross-Links

* [Artifact Signing](/security/artifact-signing)
* [Dependency Safety](/security/dependency-safety)
* [Offline Security](/security/offline-security)
* [Model Supply Chain](/security/model-supply-chain)
